Asia stands at a crossroads. The region faces surging energy demand driven by economic growth, extreme heat and the rapid expansion of AI infrastructure; all while racing to meet ambitious climate commitments. It’s a challenge that requires both technical expertise and political courage; something Joojin Kim, founder and CEO of Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC) and Climate Catalyst board member, knows intimately.
Joojin has spent decades working at the intersection of energy policy, industrial decarbonisation and climate finance across Asia. His organisation has been instrumental in challenging fossil fuel expansion in the Republic of Korea and pushing for ambitious renewable energy deployment across the region. In this conversation, he dismantles some common myths around renewable deployment, challenges the outdated narrative around gas and offers fresh insights into what it will actually take to decarbonise Asia’s energy systems.
Most importantly, he offers a message of grounded optimism: climate progress has consistently happened and will continue to happen. We need to maintain our momentum and continue to push this vital work forward.
Dive deeper into this insightful conversation, below.
Q: There are often perceived trade-offs between meeting growing demand for energy and efforts to decarbonise. How should policy makers in Asia be thinking about this?
I’m not entirely sure I’d call it a trade-off. Decarbonising while maintaining economic growth is quite imperative for the future. If the world is to reach net zero by 2050, it’s clear that electricity production from renewables has to increase dramatically. The countries that figure out how to run power systems where renewable energy electrons are the dominant resource, to quickly develop renewable power plants, and manage their financial markets so that money flows into renewables rather than fossil assets, these countries will prevail in a net zero world.
Q: This tension is only exacerbated by the record-breaking heatwaves being seen across Asia, which are further driving up electricity demand for cooling. How are these competing priorities creating a new and urgent challenge for policy makers across the region?
Cooling is certainly an important driver of emissions, but in places like the Republic of Korea, Japan and Taiwan; AI is also contributing significantly to electricity demand. To meet this demand, we need to think about how to get more renewable electrons into the system, how to develop renewable energy more quickly and effectively, and how to direct finance toward these solutions. This applies to heating, cooling and AI computing demands alike.
The world is also working on cooling ourselves more efficiently, just as AI processing is becoming more efficient. So it’s still an open question how much additional electricity we’ll ultimately need for cooling. But modeling clearly shows we’ll need substantially more electricity than before, and that electricity has to come from renewables.
Q: Against this backdrop, we’re seeing growing momentum behind efforts to cancel coal projects, such as your work in the Republic of Korea. As countries scramble to meet growing energy demands, could you share key lessons from your work that offer a model for preventing new fossil fuel lock-in?
When people thought about coal power plants – even myself – long ago, we didn’t associate them with significant emissions. Similarly, when we consider LNG (liquefied natural gas) imports, people believe, even now, that it’s somehow a better, cleaner fuel with fewer carbon impacts.
But when people encounter the reality that these fuels aren’t as clean as they think, that gas has substantial methane leakage and isn’t as emissions-efficient as commonly believed, they usually come to agree. That pressure is something businesses cannot withstand.
So the lesson here is that the revelation of the science behind coal power plants, combined with the economic reality that these are expensive, economically risky assets, has contributed significantly to our success with coal plants. Of course, we’re not there yet. We’re still operating coal plants today. But they’re definitely no longer a welcomed asset.
Q: We’re seeing gas positioned as a transition fuel on the path to fully green energy, particularly for industry decarbonisation. In the steel sector, for example, new facilities using gas but ready for hydrogen blending offer a diversion from coal-based blast furnaces. What’s your view on gas’s role in the transition?
There was a time when gas was called a transition fuel, perhaps 15 years ago or so. But renewable technology has become so advanced lately and so dominant in new investments that it’s difficult to call gas a transition fuel anymore. Emissions have risen so significantly, and the climate reality has become so severe, that allowing this alleged transition can itself be problematic.
If you use hydrogen, whether derived from gas or renewable energy, you don’t get the heat factor that carbon provides. This again will have to come from electricity. Steel plants haven’t used that much electricity compared to their size until now. They’ll need to start using significantly more electricity. Electric arc furnaces are just part of the story. As facilities transition to hydrogen furnaces, they’ll become major electricity users.
Green steel will be slightly more expensive than coal-based steel, and that premium is something consumers, businesses, or public funding will have to pay for in the future.
Q: How much more challenging is this drive away from fossil fuels in a country like South Korea where the potential for a domestic renewable energy sector is limited, compared to say India, where there is huge potential? What challenges does this pose for civil society? And for policy makers?
This question reminds me of Russia and Saudi Arabia. These are large countries, yet their solar and wind penetration is among the world’s lowest. The Republic of Korea is similar, as is Japan, though it’s somewhat higher. What this tells us is that their power systems share common characteristics.
The argument that you don’t have natural resources to build renewable energy is actually not accurate. It can be a convenient excuse, but looking at these countries, the reality is this is not a question of resource availability, but rather one on how our society and economy is organised.
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Russia’s power systems share common characteristics. These are severely bundled monopolies where incumbent power plants, typically coal and gas are state-owned facilities and have considerable leverage in the market. This leaves very limited space for innovative new technologies like renewables to enter.
Many of these countries haven’t figured out how to develop renewables quickly. They’re applying outdated systems not tailored for renewables. Central government leadership is needed to develop renewables faster. But in countries with governments accustomed to state-led monopolies on power, renewable development tends to be slow.
That’s why small nations with very dense populations often have abundant renewable resources. Uruguay is a good example, it reached nearly 100 per cent renewables quite a while ago. It’s about how you run the power system, what opportunities you create for renewable energy. The technology exists, it’s the pricing system and the fairness of market access that’s often missing.
It’s also about how organised a government is in permitting, developing and siting offshore wind, onshore wind or solar power plants. Saudi Arabia and Russia, despite their resource availability, aren’t tapping into excellent opportunities to develop their economies in efficient and economically reasonable ways.
Incumbents won’t be happy about the emergence of this new economy. They’ll be pleased if policies continue blocking renewable development or if coal-fired electricity is preferred in the power system over renewable electrons.
For economic leaders, managing that disconnect and navigating the political challenges will be important. Sometimes, inevitably, incumbents may receive compensation for earlier change, for earlier coal phase-out, more than they perhaps deserve. This has happened throughout history. But the key goal here is to reduce emissions and get rid of the harmful infrastructure as quickly as possible.
Q: So should these countries consider breaking up the monopoly of state power production to allow renewable developers in?
Not necessarily breaking up the monopoly, though that could be a step forward, but being open to new sources and new ways of producing electricity. Monopolies could actually expedite the total renewable transition. But right now, in many cases, state-owned energy companies focused on conventional power sources tend not to appreciate renewables.
Companies like Enel, the Italian state-owned company, have opened up. The renewable portion of Enel has come to dominate the company. That’s the kind of transformation we need to see more broadly.
Q: Heavy industry is the cornerstone of Asian economies but also a major emissions source. What are the most promising pathways for decarbonising this ‘hard-to-abate’ sector?
Several things need to happen. First, people have to understand that our current methods of making petrochemicals or steel are very harmful to the climate. To put it simply, people need to know that blast furnaces and naphtha crackers are no longer acceptable technologies.
Second, particularly in industries like steel, the technology exists, but there’s a cost consideration. Producers will have to pay a slightly higher cost, and some form of subsidisation is necessary for investment in new infrastructure. Public and private finance that can expedite this change is essential.
Third, the private sector, especially consumers of these heavy industry products, will have to pay a premium for greener steel rather than having society or the atmosphere absorb that burden. These steps will be needed to decarbonise the so-called hard-to-abate sectors.
Q: Based on your experience across heavy industries in South Korea, what’s the most underutilised opportunity for cross-sector collaboration?
Some industries can definitely learn from each other, for example I can say there’s much to learn from our steel decarbonisation work that petrochemical decarbonisation efforts can benefit from. However, ultimately these are different machines. For steel, we accept that some amount must be used in our economy. But whether people need to use plastic at all is a legitimate question. One of the best ways to reduce petrochemical sector emissions is simply to use less plastic. This isn’t discussed often, and it creates a fundamental difference in how we approach these sectors. Considerations on whether the sector itself is something we actually need are important.
So while there are lessons sectors can learn from one another, the facilities, equipment and respective challenges are quite different overall.
Q: How should these countries seek to achieve their decarbonisation goals while still ensuring a just transition for workers and communities built around these heavy emitting industries?
This is a very important question. There is an interesting discussion emerging in the Republic of Korea – and probably Japan – about what happens to workers when we gradually close blast furnaces. How will people working there continue their lives?
We’re already seeing effects in oil refineries, which have become slower in hiring because companies recognise limitations to their future. These have also become less attractive job opportunities for younger workers.
For regions where these high-emitting facilities are located, some form of political soft landing, often involving government support, will be needed. Determining the appropriate amount is very difficult and highly political. It depends on the historical role of steel or petrochemicals and various factors outside the industry itself.
In summary, for industries to decarbonise in a more orderly, soft-landing manner, good political leadership will be essential.
Q: South Korea is rapidly expanding its semiconductor and AI infrastructure – essentially running 24/7 cooling systems. How should policymakers navigate this collision between the AI boom’s energy appetite and climate commitments?
There’s still uncertainty about how much additional electricity we’ll need for AI development and its associated cooling. As AI technology progresses, it is becoming more efficient. Projections about energy consumption keep changing. At the same time, AI demand does appear to be driving energy use higher, so there’s no clear answer. It seems likely there will be increased energy demand.
On top of that, to decarbonise, we’ll need to rely much more heavily on electricity because it’s the only energy delivery method with a proven decarbonisation pathway: renewable energy.
For rapid renewable energy deployment to happen, governments must find ways to develop, permit, and site renewables at a faster pace. They also need to ensure renewable electrons are treated fairly in terms of grid access and pricing compared to conventional electricity. These are the two critical issues any policymaker will need to address going forward.
Q: All this renewable energy will require substantial amounts of land. Renewable energy is the way forward, but it’s also extremely resource-intensive from the perspective of land and water use. How should we navigate this?
Solar modules have become far more integrated than before. We now probably need several tens of per cent less land than a few years ago to build the same capacity solar power plant. Significant technological innovation is occurring.
Many current projections about land requirements for renewables may not be accurate. Let me give you a personal anecdote: I installed a solar panel at my house in 2017, one small module producing about 200 watts. In 2020, I installed another one producing 350 watts. The capacity nearly doubled in just three years for the same physical space.
This is happening across the industry. Wind turbines are also becoming larger and more efficient. While there are physical limits to consolidating semiconductors in a solar panel, the technology continues advancing rapidly.
You can’t really predict how efficient these technologies will become. If you look at International Energy Agency projections on solar costs, they expected high prices and were wrong every year. They kept predicting incorrectly year after year.
But here’s what matters: we’re late in our renewable deployment. Regardless of projections about how cheap panels will become or how much electricity AI will require, we must ensure all necessary policy measures are in place. That means faster permitting and more centralised, national policy for developing and siting renewable power plants. It also means making grid access and pricing fair for renewable electrons compared to conventional electricity. These steps must be taken regardless of technological uncertainties.
Q: Throughout this conversation, it’s become clear that finance, both public and private, will be essential for this transition. But we’re discussing green premiums at a time when these industries are extremely cost- and price-competitive. For developing countries in Asia where finance isn’t easily available, what solutions do you see for funding this transition?
That’s a good point. To decarbonise the industrial sector, public and private finance will be required to accelerate new technology development.
For developing nations, which often possess more renewable resources, this transition can open up opportunities to host primary production facilities, such as green steel or green shipping fuels (like ammonia). The monetisation of this comparative advantage is mainly through trade. By trading these renewable energy-derived products, such as green iron or green ammonia, more opportunities for public and private finance may open up.
Q: Looking ahead, what is the most important message you would like to share with organisations like Climate Catalyst about navigating Asia’s complex energy transition?
Despite often negative messaging about climate change and widespread cynicism, climate progress has consistently happened ever since the world realised that carbon dioxide is heating the planet.
Change will happen. That’s my message, we need to maintain that perspective and keep working toward our goals.
We’re grateful to Joojin for taking the time to speak with us and share his insights on this critical yet complex transition. You’ll find alot more information about the work he leads as well as a number of insightful resources over at Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC)
